



IHS Markit®

COVID-19 Violent Risk Overview

1 April 2020

Executive Summary

This report gives a brief summary of how the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) virus is likely to affect labour strikes, protest and riot, civil war, interstate and terrorism risks. It will look at each region and consider the short-term and long-term implications. In this report we judge “short-term” to cover the period during which the disease is spreading, and “long-term” to be after the spread has peaked and some form of normality is returning. Included are our violent risk score changes due to the pandemic; note that some have gone down.

It should be noted that the actual spread of the disease, its perceived spread and the reaction by the public, governments and non-state groups, will differ globally, regionally and even within countries. For example, most of Europe is behind Italy in the rate of spread, the US government is behind most of Europe in its reaction, and China is starting to regain some form of routine operation. We will consider the COVID-19 virus’s impact on existing grievances and conflicts, as well as its impact on those triggered by the pandemic. We will assess the violent risk outlook in each region in greater detail in subsequent reports.

Asia-Pacific

	Short term (while COVID-19 is still spreading)	Longer term (post-peak)
Protests & riots	Enhanced restrictions on domestic movement across Asian countries will limit the scope for social unrest and slow existing protest movements, like in Indonesia and Hong Kong, while containment measures are in place. Lockdowns have been enforced strictly by security forces, particularly in South Asia, including Pakistan, Bangladesh and India, where military forces have been deployed to enforce restrictions.	Debate around state responses and availability of financial support is likely to emerge in Asian countries as containment measures are eased. This is likely to trigger anti-government sentiment and protests that are particularly vulnerable to violence across South Asia and in Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. In Hong Kong, the government’s COVID-19 virus response has faced broad criticism by the population, especially the pro-democracy supporters. Anti-government protests will likely gain momentum with pro-democracy anniversaries from June 2020, including the one-year anniversary of last year’s rallies, likely to mobilise protesters.
Labour unrest	Barring sporadic and predominantly peaceful strike action by under-pressure health workers across Asia, labour unrest will decline and remain low while containment measures are in place.	The COVID-19 virus pandemic’s economic impact is likely to drive industrial action in Asian countries with large manufacturing sectors – most notably in Cambodia (garment and footwear), Indonesia (garment and footwear, automotive), Vietnam (electronics, textile, garment and footwear), South Korea (automotive) and Bangladesh (garment) – while countries reliant on tourism – Thailand, Sri Lanka and the Maldives – will also probably experience likely disruptive industrial action.

Civil war	The intensity of the ongoing civil war in Afghanistan is likely to marginally abate while containment measures are in place, although broader fighting will probably continue. This will result in reduced threat levels to airports and ground cargo, with the Taliban seeking to reduce disruption to domestic supply chains.	The COVID-19 virus pandemic's impact on the US economy will likely drive Washington's intent to withdraw financially and militarily from Afghanistan, undermining the Kabul government's negotiating leverage in peace talks with the Taliban. This will increase the likelihood of talks collapsing, triggering a new civil conflict with different targeting dynamics. Beyond Afghanistan, the COVID-19 virus pandemic will likely exacerbate low-intensity separatist movements in Pakistan (Balochistan), and Papua New Guinea (Bougainville), which in part are rooted in local economic grievances.
Interstate war	Interstate war flashpoints in Asia, most notably India and Pakistan and South and North Korea, are unlikely to be affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, although in the case of India and Pakistan, some reduction in border skirmishes in Kashmir is likely should security forces be redeployed domestically to enforce containment measures.	The pandemic is unlikely to trigger meaningful intergovernmental co-operation in the Indian subcontinent or on the Korean peninsula that would result in a sustained reduction in interstate war risks.
Terrorism	Ongoing militant operations are likely to remain largely unaffected by the pandemic. If anything, a marginal short-term reduction in militant activity is likely in Afghanistan, where NSAGs are more dependent on public sentiment and support. In the Philippines, the ceasefire announced by the government and communist militants to deal with the pandemic is likely to reduce contact incidents.	An extended deployment of the military in Pakistan to enforce the country's lockdown would present Islamist militant groups with an opportunity to reorganise and revive their capabilities. In the Philippines, lack of trust between the government and communist militants is likely to lead to the resumption of fighting once the COVID-19 virus is brought under control.

Europe

	Short term (while COVID-19 is still spreading)	Longer term (post-peak)
Protests & riots	Protests and riots will be negligible in the immediate term given lockdown conditions and curfews in some countries, including Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine. However, civil unrest sparked by lack of access to basic goods – as has been indicated in parts of Italy – is a potential risk to food and other key goods retailers as lockdown continues. Low-income populations are most likely to act in this regard, especially if lockdowns are extended on a rolling basis and authorities do not take effective action to provide them with support. This would most	Economically motivated anti-government protests are probable across the wider region if economic recovery is slow and uneven. Former Soviet countries, particularly Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Russia will be hit hard due to the double impact of the COVID-19 virus and oil price collapse. Economic dissatisfaction will also raise the likelihood of ethnic violence in parts of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Elsewhere, protests motivated by economic conditions are most likely to turn violent in Greece, France, and Spain, with government buildings and assets belonging to well-

	likely manifest in looting, with potential property damage to retailers.	known multinational brands likely to be targeted for damage.
Labour unrest	Labour unrest is likely to subside across the entire region in the short term due to work furloughs during the lockdown, and to the various government-backed schemes to pay wages to workers during lockdowns.	EU institutions and national governments across Europe and the former Soviet countries are providing financial support and seeking to stimulate economic growth. However, if economic recovery is slow and uneven, and especially if wage levels are negatively affected, labour unrest is likely across many parts of the wider region. Examples include countries with ongoing pre-COVID-19 labour-management conflicts such as anti-pension reform protests in France and Spain, and those which are being hit by low oil prices, such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Russia, where wildcat strikes would be a characteristic tactic.
Civil war	Regionally, civil war risks – very low across almost all the region – are unlikely to be affected by the COVID-19 virus pandemic. In the case of the east Ukraine conflict, where Russia is effectively a party to the conflict, we do not assess it to be viable or in the interests of any of the parties to seek to alter the current situation during the pandemic.	Civil war risks are unlikely to shift regionally; the most likely change would be in Donbas. In the event of a deep recession in Russia, the Kremlin would be more likely to push its proxies harder in eastern Ukraine as a distraction tactic domestically, thus elevating war and terrorism risks in eastern Ukraine.
Interstate war	The COVID-19 virus pandemic is unlikely to change interstate war risks in the short term.	Across most of the region there is no viable interstate war scenario, with one exception. In an extreme situation where Russia was undergoing a deep recession prompting widespread public dissatisfaction, a low-likelihood scenario would be renewed aggression against neighbours to deflect domestic attention from economic difficulties. This would most likely entail intensification of support for the separatists in eastern Ukraine or the low-likelihood scenario of hybrid tactics including territorial incursions against its Baltic neighbours. Similar actions would be likely in Georgia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Terrorism	Terrorist activity is unlikely to be impacted by the COVID-19 virus in the short term, apart from countries where urban curfews and lockdowns are in place, which will curtail capabilities to prepare and execute attacks, as well as restricting the availability of 'soft' targets.	Heightened political unrest driven by economic grievances would be most likely to motivate terrorist activity in areas with already high levels of armed non-state actor contention, notably in Russia's North Caucasus.

Latin America

	Short term (while COVID-19 is still spreading)	Longer term (post-peak)
Protests & riots	<p>There is a high risk of panic-buying degenerating into looting across Latin America. There have already been incidents in Mexico, Colombia, and Chile and this risk is likely to increase once the COVID-19 fatality rate starts to rise in the region and if severe supply chain disruptions lead to goods scarcity. Larger politically and economically motivated protests are likely to decrease as the population realises the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic. However smaller outbreaks of violent confrontations between security forces and local residents refusing to follow government social distancing guidelines are likely in most countries. In Honduras, groups are protesting to demand subsidies, food and stable utility services.</p>	<p>The risk of politically or economically motivated protests is likely to increase once the peak of COVID-19 cases ends and social distancing measures are permanently lifted. The region will be in economic recession and governments across the region will likely struggle to appease growing funding pressures given the need for expanded healthcare and welfare outlays, job protection schemes, and subsidies, tax- and debt-related relief for badly affected businesses. This is likely to translate into road blockades, arson and vandalism of commercial property across the region.</p>
Labour unrest	<p>Workers across the region are demanding job protection and help to prevent the spread of the COVID-19 virus. The risk of strikes is high for companies not promoting social distancing or confinement measures. In Central America, cargo transportation workers are a likely early source of protests and strikes.</p>	<p>The risk of labour unions demanding, via strikes, job protection, salary increases and health-related assistance is likely to increase once the COVID-19 pandemic reduces in severity. Workers are likely to call for the nationalisation of companies wanting to reduce payroll and their strikes are likely to turn violent if they perceive no support from their respective governments.</p>
Civil war	<p>The left-wing National Liberation Army (ELN) insurgent group has called for a ceasefire in Colombia due to the COVID-19 virus. Some dissident FARC insurgents have also said they will enforce social distance measures, temporarily reducing civil war risks.</p>	<p>The conflict between the Colombian state the ELN and dissident FARC members will renew with terrorism risks being high for pipelines, electricity and bridges in areas such as Antioquia, Arauca, Atlántico, Bolívar, Chocó, Nariño, and Norte de Santander.</p> <p>The probability of an armed insurgency rising in Venezuela will increase if the government of President Nicolás Maduro collapses and the pro-US political opposition takes power.</p>
Interstate war	<p>The probability of Latin American governments entering war is low. The US administration is unlikely to initiate an armed conflict by deploying its military in Venezuela.</p>	<p>The probability of Latin American governments entering war is low. The US administration is unlikely to initiate an armed conflict by deploying its military in Venezuela.</p>

<p>Terrorism</p>	<p>Terrorism risks are likely to decrease in Latin America over the next three months. The ELN insurgent group has declared a truce in Colombia, Peru's Shining Path is focusing more on drug trafficking in remote coca regions than on terrorist attacks in cities or against critical infrastructure assets and the Paraguayan People's Army (Ejército del Pueblo Paraguayo: EPP) in Paraguay is mostly limited to the occasional kidnapping of farm owners or sporadic armed confrontations with security forces. In Chile, extremist indigenous Mapuche groups are likely to continue to carry out arson attacks against private assets in the southern Araucanía, Bio-bio and Los Lagos regions. This is likely to affect mainly agriculture and forestry sectors and cargo in-transit. Other assets are also sometimes targeted, such as electricity infrastructure.</p>	<p>In Colombia, the ELN will continue to be the main terrorism threat; peace negotiations are unlikely as the militants will continue kidnapping and carrying out attacks on infrastructure assets using explosives. ELN membership is likely to increase if a COVID-19-induced economic recession results in large job losses, and reduction of informal jobs in large cities. Many of the unemployed will look to engage in coca growing and smuggling in border areas, bringing them into the ELN. This will also apply to the FARC dissidents, who are also involved in drug trafficking. In Peru, the Shining Path only poses a security threat in the southern central VRAEM, a coca region, through drug-trafficking activities and occasional attacks on military helicopters and small army bases. There is a low risk of natural gas and construction companies expanding operations in the VRAEM being targeted by Shining Path for extortion, sabotage, and destruction of machinery and equipment. Arson attacks against private assets in Chile's Araucanía and neighbouring regions by Mapuche extremist groups are likely to continue in the coming year.</p>
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Middle East & North Africa

	<p>Short term (while COVID-19 is still spreading)</p>	<p>Longer term (post-peak)</p>
<p>Protests & riots</p>	<p>There is a lower risk of protests and riots in urban areas across the MENA region, particularly in key outbreak countries such as Iran, where protestors will be concerned about contracting the virus. The opposite is likely in remote and less well-served areas, with the exception of Israel, Turkey and Gulf Arab states. The exact level of vulnerability will depend on the ability of the government to show a credible response. Tunisia, Lebanon, and Iraq are especially vulnerable due to very low government capability in remote areas. The commercial impact of such unrest is likely to be minimal.</p>	<p>The most vulnerable countries for unrest turning destabilising are Iran, Algeria, and Tunisia. Iran's leadership is highly affected by COVID-19, and the pandemic is exacerbating pre-existing anti-government sentiments. Israel is likely to see a wave of anti-Netanyahu protests in the aftermath of the outbreak, given the prime minister's efforts to use COVID-19 to evade standing trial for corruption. Tunisia and Algeria are in the middle of thus far peaceful political transitions, but are highly vulnerable. By contrast, the government's thus far adequate response reduces unrest risks in Jordan.</p>
<p>Labour unrest</p>	<p>Labour unrest is likely to subside everywhere in the region except Iran, where ongoing grievances over pay and lack of health and safety standards are being exacerbated.</p>	<p>The worsening economic situation is likely to force governments in Oman, Tunisia, Morocco especially to reduce spending, raising the risk of unrest. Other governments that are forced to cut spending after</p>

	Healthcare sector workers in vulnerable countries like Egypt, Lebanon, and potentially Algeria are likely to protest peacefully.	widening their deficits to address COVID-19 are likely to have a similar impact.
Civil war	<p>Syria's civil war is likely to slow down temporarily. Iraq's civil war risks have increased as reduced funding makes militia infighting more likely.</p> <p>Despite calls for ceasefires in Libya and Yemen due to the COVID-19 pandemic, these are very unlikely to be enforced.</p>	A prolonged fall in oil prices reduces the revenues available to Iran, increasing instability risks. As the IRGC will not surrender power without fighting, this also increases civil war risks. Similarly, Iraqi militias are more likely to fight one another. There is also a growing likelihood that the economic downturn would encourage US President Donald Trump to suddenly withdraw from Syria and Iraq. This would almost certainly lead to Islamic State resurging and to growing civil war risks.
Interstate war	COVID-19 is unlikely to significantly change interstate war risks in the short term, although governments of countries where the outbreak is particularly acute are likely to delay escalatory actions until after the first COVID-19 wave.	<p>Saudi Arabia's ability to pursue the war in Yemen will be reduced due to lower oil prices. This will incentivise the Houthi to increase their attacks, but is also likely to facilitate a ceasefire.</p> <p>Iran may well become more desperate due to increased pressure and a worsening economy, increasing its risk appetite and raising Iran-US war risks affecting Gulf countries.</p>
Terrorism	Terrorist activity is unlikely to be affected by COVID-19 in the short term, apart from countries where urban curfews and lockdowns are in place which will curtail capabilities to prepare and execute attacks, as well as restrict the availability of 'soft' targets.	Countries that experience political unrest due to COVID-19, such as Algeria and Tunisia, are also likely to experience an increase in terrorist activity.

Sub-Saharan Africa

	Short term (while COVID-19 is still spreading)	Longer term (post-peak)
Protests & riots	Major social unrest in Sub-Saharan Africa would most likely take the form of rioting and looting in densely populated urban areas most affected by shortages of basic goods due to restricted movements and disrupted trade. The risk will be acute in underserved areas like informal settlements which are more exposed to contagion due to lack of basic sanitation and healthcare provision. With any SSA communities linking COVID-19 with frequent travel, individuals of Asian or European descent and wealthier nationals or diaspora returnees	Risks of larger outbreaks of unrest will be higher in countries with disputed electoral processes like Guinea, Malawi, Ethiopia, Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso. Attempts to stall electoral reforms or restrict opposition activities using the excuse of ongoing COVID-19 precautions, particularly in countries where the president or ruling party is at high risk of losing power, will be a major driver of violent protest. Across the continent, protests will also be driven by disputes over compensation or poverty alleviation measures, particularly if governments are perceived to be

	are at risk of harassment and theft, while associated businesses at greater risk of looting.	favouring certain groups or ethnicities, and because the resources to achieve this will be scarce.
Labour unrest	Industrial action is likely to be concentrated in the public sector as many underfunded government services face mounting pressure due to the public health emergency. Lingering issues of inadequate pay – especially in countries like DRC, South Africa and Zimbabwe – are compounded by insufficient equipment provision across the continent. Healthcare professionals are likely to strike in the form of ‘stay at home’, while grievances among security forces are likely to escalate to mutinies and desertions.	Payment arrears are likely to build up in the public sector, particularly in countries like Nigeria, Gabon, and Zambia, which are heavily dependent on export revenue from commodities like oil, gas or copper. The intensity and duration of strikes is likely to be driven by the degree of COVID-19 restrictions, which will have already impoverished a large percentage of households forced to draw on their limited reserves. Prolonged disruptions to transport, tourism and hospitality sectors will likely result in retrenchments, as well as restructuring of many already struggling national and regional airlines, prompting industrial action in countries like South Africa, Kenya and Senegal.
Civil war	Non-state armed groups in Mali and Cameroon have sustained their campaigns to destabilise the government, particularly via attacks on recently conducted legislative polls. This continued activity and the COVID-19 outbreak is likely to erode government willingness to engage in dialogue. Priority targets are likely to remain government assets, security forces and UN in Mali, with tactics including kidnap for ransom and ambush of convoys in transit.	The severity of the financial impact on Nigeria through the loss of oil revenues is likely to deepen pre-existing animosities between the country’s main ethnic groups when central government is deprived of the funding to share wealth out. There will be a high risk of sectarian rioting and militancy in the Middle Belt and renewed Niger Delta militancy if the government is forced to terminate the amnesty scheme. Risks of renewed widespread fighting in CAR and Somalia will be highest around the preparations and conduct of elections slated for late 2020 and early 2021 respectively; in CAR, an indicator of increased risk is former president François Bozizé seeking to compete in polls.
Interstate war	Disruptions in trade – particularly from border closures and resulting shortages – will aggravate bilateral relations between transit countries and landlocked neighbours. While this is unlikely to escalate to violence, it will undermine regional integration initiatives, especially in the Horn and East Africa.	A severe economic impact in fragile landlocked countries is likely to provoke economic migration on a significant scale, increasing the risk of border closures and cross-border skirmishes as security forces of littoral countries attempt to enforce restrictions.
Terrorism	Islamist militant groups in Sahel, Lake Chad and northern Mozambique have taken advantage of distracted governments and stretched security forces with continued attacks. In the short term, focus will likely remain on consolidating control, mostly in rural areas, and targeting security forces while in transit or based at remote posts.	Islamist groups throughout the continent are likely to view a prolonged pandemic as an opportunity to pursue long-term aims of seizing de-facto control of large areas. This applies to Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in Nigeria, Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) in Mozambique and Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (Al-Shabaab) in Somalia and Kenya. Al-Qaeda-linked groups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger are likely to step up attacks and even seek

		the total collapse of central governments unable to provide even basic security and services.
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Appendix: Risk Score Changes

Country	Risk	From	To	Change	Justification
Afghanistan	Civil war	5.2	5.0	-0.2	The intensity of the civil war is likely to decline, with all sides seeking to help contain COVID-19 infections.
Albania	Protests and riots	2.5	2.4	-0.1	Curfews and lockdown will lower the risk of protests in the near term.
Algeria	Interstate war	1.7	1.7	0	Score affirmation: War risks between Algeria and Morocco likely to remain elevated despite being among the highest spenders on defence in Africa.
American Samoa	Protests and riots	0.6	0.4	-0.2	COVID-19 outbreak likely to result in smaller violent protests due to implementation of isolation regimes.
Angola	Protests and riots	2.6	2.9	0.3	Protests in Luanda are likely to increase as the oil price fall likely leads to cancellation of some social programmes.
Australia	Protests and riots	1.0	1.1	0.1	Government instability and mounting pressure around climate change to trigger more protests over the next year on a regular but infrequent basis.
Australia	Civil war	0.2	0.3	0.1	Unprecedented uncertainty brought by the COVID-19 outbreak combined with the emergence of a right-wing protest movement increases the risk slightly.
Australia	Labour strikes	2.2	2.2	0	Score affirmation: Regular industrial action affecting mining and aviation sectors but disruption rarely lasts longer than three days.
Australia	Terrorism	1.1	1.1	0	Score affirmation: Remains an aspirational target for jihadist militants and there is a growing risk of right-wing terrorism.
Australia	Interstate war	0.7	0.6	-0.1	Tensions with Beijing have eased in recent months and maritime disputes involving the use of force against China remain unlikely.
Austria	Protests and riots	2.1	1.8	-0.3	The government's emergency measures to contain the spread of the COVID-19 virus have reduced the probability of larger protests.
Azerbaijan	Protests and riots	2.6	2.7	0.1	Currency depreciation caused by low oil price increases likelihood of economically motivated anti-government protests.
Azerbaijan	Labour strikes	2.3	2.4	0.1	Currency depreciation due to low oil price increases likelihood of wildcat strikes as workers are likely to demand higher wages to offset inflation.
Bangladesh	Labour strikes	4.6	4.8	0.2	Labour unrest in the garment sector is likely after COVID-19 containment measures are eased.
Bangladesh	Protests and riots	2.6	2.8	0.2	Protests related to the government's COVID-19 response are likely after containment measures are relaxed.
Belarus	Protests and riots	1.4	1.3	-0.1	Government restrictions on assembly due to the COVID-19 outbreak are likely to reduce protest risks in the one-year outlook.
Belgium	Labour strikes	2.3	2.1	-0.2	Industrial action is likely to subside overall over the COVID-19 outbreak, except in the health sector and security services if overburdened.
Belgium	Protests and riots	2.6	2.3	-0.3	Protests likely to subside overall as movement and gatherings are restricted during the COVID-19 outbreak.
Belize	Labour strikes	2.2	2.3	0.1	Probability of unions striking to prevent layoffs to rise over the next year as negative effect of COVID-19 hurts the economy.

Bolivia, Plurinational State of	Labour strikes	3.3	4.0	0.7	Probability of unions striking to prevent layoffs to rise over the next year as COVID-19 hurts the economy.
Bolivia, Plurinational State of	Protests and riots	3.4	3.6	0.2	Increasing political instability and public-service shortages due to the COVID-19 outbreak make disruptive, violent protests more likely.
Burkina Faso	Protests and riots	3.6	3.5	-0.1	Government has banned public gatherings until at least 30 April.
Cambodia	Labour strikes	2.6	2.8	0.2	The adverse economic impact of COVID-19 on the manufacturing sector increases the risk of strikes.
Cameroon	Protests and riots	2.9	2.9	0	Score affirmation: Low oil price increases chance of protests over poor government service provision, but political opposition remains weak.
Canada	Protests and riots	1.8	1.4	-0.4	The COVID-19 outbreak is likely to result in smaller violent protests due to implementation of isolation regimes.
China	Protests and riots	1.7	1.7	0	Score affirmation: Stronger security measures mitigate risk of protests due to COVID-19 impacts.
China	Labour strikes	2.4	2.4	0	Score affirmation: Regulations around employment strengthened to protect labour rights during the COVID-19 outbreak.
Congo, the Democratic Republic of the	Protests and riots	3.2	3.6	0.4	COVID-19 cases in Kinshasa increase the likelihood of protests and looting of medical facilities, pharmacies, and shops.
Congo, the Democratic Republic of the	Terrorism	3.9	4.1	0	The escape of the former Bakata Katanga militia leader amid co-ordinated raids indicates increasing militant attack risks in DRC's Katanga region.
Congo, the Democratic Republic of the	Civil war	3.0	3.1	0	The escape of a former militia leader amid co-ordinated raids indicates possible dissatisfaction by Katangan elites with President Tshisekedi.
Costa Rica	Labour strikes	2.5	3.1	0.6	Probability of unions striking to prevent layoffs to rise over the next year as COVID-19 hurts the economy.
Costa Rica	Protests and riots	2.4	2.5	0.1	Protest risks are higher due to likely rise in unemployment - already at 12% - due to COVID-19.
Côte d'Ivoire	Civil war	2.9	2.6	0	President Ouattara's decision not to seek a third term greatly reduces the risk of armed conflict around the late 2020 poll.
Côte d'Ivoire	Protests and riots	3.2	3.0	-0.2	Probable new regulations restricting gatherings will likely combine with a reluctance to gather in large crowds to reduce political protests.
Croatia	Labour strikes	2.2	2.0	-0.2	Industrial action likely to subside overall over the COVID-19 outbreak, except in the health sector and security services if overburdened.
Croatia	Protests and riots	1.4	1.1	-0.3	Protests likely to subside overall as movement and gatherings are restricted during the COVID-19 outbreak.
Czechia	Protests and riots	1.4	1.0	-0.4	State of emergency and restrictions on mass gatherings and movement will limit anti-government protests.
Dominican Republic	Protests and riots	2.4	2.5	0.1	Proliferation of disinformation throughout social media and panic buying to increase looting risks.
Dominican Republic	Protests and riots	2.5	2.5	0.0	Score affirmation: Protests in the form of looting are more likely than large-scale anti-government gatherings.
Ecuador	Protests and riots	2.9	3.3	0.4	Probability of economically motivated protests to rise as negative effect of COVID-19 hurts the economy.
Ecuador	Labour strikes	3.3	3.5	0.2	Probability of unions striking to prevent layoffs to rise over the next year as negative effect of COVID-19 hurts the economy.
Equatorial Guinea	Labour strikes	2.0	2.2	0.2	Oil price decline and COVID-19 impact likely to drive opposition and labour concerns about living conditions.
Equatorial Guinea	Protests and riots	2.1	2.3	0.2	Oil price decline and COVID-19 impact likely to drive opposition and labour concerns about living conditions.

Ethiopia	Protests and riots	3.7	3.8	0.1	Anti-foreigner sentiment around the COVID-19 outbreak increases the risk of violent protests targeting (especially white and Asian) expatriates.
Ethiopia	Protests and riots	3.8	3.8	0.0	Score affirmation: Localised anti-government protests are likely if the August elections are delayed over the COVID-19 outbreak, which is likely.
Finland	Labour strikes	2.6	2.3	-0.3	The risk will probably decrease due to the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak and conclusion of wage negotiations in Q1 2020.
France	Civil war	1.2	1.3	0.1	Shortage of food, medicines and other goods likely to lead to riots, increasing anti-government sentiment.
France	Protests and riots	3.1	3.1	0	Score affirmation: Restrictions on movement and public gatherings unlikely to reduce the risk of violence and property damage around protests.
France	Labour strikes	3.4	3.2	-0.2	Industrial action likely to subside overall over the COVID-19 outbreak, except in the health sector and security services if overburdened.
French Guiana	Labour strikes	1.6	2.2	0.6	Strong trade unions follow the model of mainland France; disruptive industrial action is likely.
Gabon	Protests and riots	2.7	2.5	-0.2	Restrictions on gatherings due to COVID-19 measures are likely to last for months
Georgia	Protests and riots	3.0	3.2	0.2	Adverse impact of COVID-19 on key sectors, including hospitality industry, increases likelihood of economically motivated anti-government protests.
Georgia	Labour strikes	2.7	2.8	0.1	Adverse economic impact of COVID-19 pandemic increases likelihood of wildcat strikes as business owners will struggle with paying their employees.
Georgia	Protests and riots	3.2	3.0	-0.2	The agreement between the government and opposition over format of upcoming general election reduces likelihood of anti-government protests.
Germany	Protests and riots	2.2	1.9	-0.3	The government's emergency measures to contain the spread of the COVID-19 virus have significantly reduced the probability of larger protests.
Ghana	Protests and riots	2.8	3.0	0.2	Politically motivated protests driven by opposition discontents over the voters' register and living conditions ahead of 2020 elections.
Ghana	Labour strikes	2.9	3.0	0.1	Public protests over increased living costs ahead of the December 2020 elections.
Guam	Protests and riots	1.8	1.4	-0.4	COVID-19 outbreak likely to result in smaller violent protests due to implementation of isolation regimes.
Guinea	Terrorism	1.4	1.4	0	Score affirmation: There is still no sign of Islamist groups building up support in Guinea, although they remain rooted in neighbour Mali.
Guinea	Interstate war	1.3	1.4	0	Guinea is likely to face criticism from neighbours if strongly contested political changes spill over into violence affecting border communities.
Guinea	Protests and riots	4.1	3.8	-0.3	The intensity of political protest is likely to fall because gatherings are likely to be banned under COVID-19 restrictions.
Guyana	Protests and riots	2.3	2.6	0.3	Lack of adequate response by government amid electoral fraud allegations and panic buying increasing looting risks.
Honduras	Protests and riots	2.7	2.8	0.1	Increased probability of popular protests over the next year as negative effects of COVID-19 hurt the economy.
Honduras	Labour strikes	3.3	3.3	0	Score affirmation: Probability of unions striking to prevent layoffs to rise over the next year as negative effects of COVID-19 hurt the economy.
Hong Kong	Protests and riots	4.2	4.2	0	Score affirmation: Continued high likelihood of protests in second half of 2020 as government remains reluctant to address demands.

Hong Kong	Labour strikes	2.4	2.4	0	Score affirmation: City-wide strike unlikely but industrial action by medical staff remains at high risk due to inadequate COVID-19 government action.
Iceland	Labour strikes	1.6	1.8	0.2	New trade union leadership supports more strike action than in the past as demonstrated in Reykjavík in Q1 2020.
India	Protests and riots	3.5	3.1	-0.4	Protests against the new citizenship law will highly likely be stymied given a COVID-19 outbreak risk, at least in the three-month outlook.
India	Interstate war	3.4	3.2	0.2	Government efforts are likely to focus on domestic management of COVID-19 outbreak, reducing likelihood of skirmishes with Pakistan.
Indonesia	Protests and riots	2.9	2.7	-0.2	COVID-19 likely to reduce likelihood of large-scale anti-government protests.
Indonesia	Labour strikes	3.1	3.3	0.2	The adverse economic impact of COVID-19 on the manufacturing sector increases the risk of strikes.
Iran, Islamic Republic of	Protests and riots	2.8	2.9	0.1	Continued COVID-19 pandemic amid natural disasters likely to increase frequency of disruptive protests.
Iraq	Protests and riots	3.9	3.9	0	Score affirmation: Despite curfews to contain COVID-19 pandemic, protesters will continue blocking strategic roads.
Iraq	Labour strikes	2.6	2.6	0	Score affirmation: Despite business closures to limit the spread of COVID-19, oil sector workers will strike over delayed payment.
Ireland	Protests and riots	1.2	1.1	-0.1	The government's emergency measures to contain the spreading of the COVID-19 virus have reduced the probability of larger protests.
Israel	Protests and riots	2.7	2.9	0.2	Protests against indicted Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu are likely to intensify as the COVID-19 outbreak subsides towards late 2020.
Israel	Interstate war	3.6	3.3	0	The focus of the Israeli government, Gaza-based Palestinian factions, and Hizbullah on the COVID-19 crisis lowers war risks.
Italy	Protests and riots	2.7	2.5	-0.2	Popular support for government policies on COVID-19 and general lockdown will lower protest risks in near term
Japan	Labour strikes	0.9	1.0	0.1	Increasing membership in unions by foreign workers, particularly from Southeast Asia, increases the probability of strikes rather than go-slows.
Jordan	Labour strikes	3.2	3.2	0	Score affirmation: State of emergency closing workplaces and banning public gatherings will temporarily pause most strikes.
Jordan	Terrorism	1.8	1.8	0	Score affirmation: Lack of terrorist activity confirms elevated risk, intent likely remains on security forces and tourism.
Kazakhstan	Protests and riots	2.3	2.4	0.1	Currency depreciation caused by low oil price increases likelihood of economically motivated anti-government protests.
Kazakhstan	Labour strikes	3.1	3.2	0.1	Currency depreciation due to low oil price increases likelihood of wildcat strikes as workers are likely to demand higher wages to offset inflation.
Kenya	Protests and riots	3.0	3.1	0.1	Increasing likelihood of basic goods inflation and shortages due to COVID-19-related disruption increases protest risks.
Kenya	Protests and riots	3.1	3.0	-0.1	Ban on public gatherings due to COVID-19 likely to mitigate near-term protest risks.
Korea, Republic of	Labour strikes	3.0	2.7	-0.3	The frequency and size of labour strikes around spring negotiations are likely to be dampened by COVID-19.
Latvia	Protests and riots	1.4	1.0	-0.4	Risk of peaceful protests by healthcare workers has decreased; in general protest activity likely to reduce due to the COVID-19 situation.
Lebanon	Protests and riots	3.5	3.7	0.2	Anti-government protests are likely to rebound as the state is unable to contain or treat those infected by the COVID-19 virus.
Lebanon	Terrorism	2.4	2.4	0	Score affirmation: Reduced funding from Iran and widened US sanctions increases risk of Hizbullah threatening or assassinating domestic rivals.

Liberia	Protests and riots	2.8	3.0	0.2	Attempts to enforce strict COVID-19 limitations on movements are likely to provoke multiple riots in the capital Monrovia.
Liberia	Labour strikes	2.7	2.9	0	Falls in government revenue induced by the COVID-19-related economic slowdown are likely to provoke further public-sector strikes over unpaid wages
Macao	Protests and riots	1.0	1.0	0	Score affirmation: Protests unlikely due to strong security presence.
Macao	Labour strikes	1.6	1.6	0	Score affirmation: Due to COVID-19 impacts, employees in the gaming sector may carry out industrial action over pay and working conditions.
Malawi	Protests and riots	3.0	3.3	0.2	Protests are likely to worsen, the longer Mutharika holds onto power and ignores a court injunction nullifying his election in 2019.
Malawi	Protests and riots	3.3	3.3	0.0	Score affirmation: Anti-government protests likely to become more violently repressed because new army chief is allied to President.
Malaysia	Protests and riots	2.2	2.0	-0.2	Concerns over spread of COVID-19 likely to reduce anti-government protests.
Maldives	Protests and riots	2.5	2.8	0.3	A potential widespread impact of a COVID-19 outbreak on the tourism sector is likely to trigger more protests, in the event of job losses.
Mali	Protests and riots	3.5	3.5	0	Score affirmation: Government likely to ban public gatherings if COVID-19 takes hold.
Malta	Labour strikes	0.6	0.5	-0.1	Industrial action likely to subside overall over the COVID-19 outbreak, except in the health sector and security services if overburdened.
Malta	Protests and riots	1.1	0.9	-0.2	Protests likely to overall subside as movement and gatherings are restricted during the COVID-19 outbreak.
Martinique	Terrorism	0.6	1.0	0.4	Homegrown Islamist radicalisation in Trinidad & Tobago increases risk of attacks in Martinique as an opportunity to target France.
Martinique	Labour strikes	1.8	1.9	0.1	Strong trade unions follow the model of mainland France; disruptive industrial action is likely.
Martinique	Civil war	1.4	1.4	0	Score affirmation: Lack of a significant independence movement.
Martinique	Interstate war	0.7	0.7	0	Score affirmation: There is a very low chance that any interstate disputes will result in even a limited use of military force.
Mexico	Protests and riots	2.8	3.0	0.2	Probability of economically motivated protests to rise as negative effect of COVID-19 hurts the economy.
Mexico	Labour strikes	3.2	3.4	0.2	Probability of unions striking to prevent layoffs to rise over the next year as negative effect of COVID-19 hurts the economy.
Mongolia	Protests and riots	1.2	1.3	0.1	Protest risks increase due to economic slowdown and approaching elections.
Mongolia	Labour strikes	1.6	1.6	0	Score affirmation: Due to COVID-19 impacts, industrial action in mining-related industries over pay or working conditions are increasingly likely.
Morocco	Civil war	0.8	0.8	0	Score affirmation: No new evidence of organised insurgency or separatist demands likely to lead to civil war.
Morocco	Interstate war	1.8	1.8	0	Score affirmation: War risks between Algeria and Morocco likely to remain elevated despite being among the highest spenders on defence in Africa.
Morocco	Protests and riots	3.1	3.0	-0.1	Likely temporary protests lull due to authorities announcing prohibition of gatherings of more than 50 people to contain spread of COVID-19 virus.
Morocco	Labour strikes	3.1	3.0	-0.1	Spread of COVID-19 likely to further highlight malfunctions in the healthcare system, but doctors' strikes likely to pause temporarily during pandemic.

Myanmar	Terrorism	2.6	2.9	0.3	Despite the risk of COVID-19 contagion, fighting is highly likely to remain heightened, particularly in Rakhine state.
Nepal	Labour strikes	2.6	2.9	0.3	A continued suspension of projects beyond the three-month outlook will likely trigger attempts to strike from labour unions on livelihood issues.
Netherlands	Protests and riots	1.9	1.7	-0.2	The government's emergency measures to contain the spread of the COVID-19 virus have significantly reduced the probability of larger protests.
New Zealand	Terrorism	0.5	0.6	0.1	There is an increasing risk of right-wing terrorism.
New Zealand	Protests and riots	0.8	0.8	0	Score affirmation: Elections and uncertainty surrounding the COVID-19 outbreak will not result in an increase in the protest risk.
New Zealand	Civil war	0.2	0.2	0	Score affirmation: The risk of civil war remains negligible.
New Zealand	Interstate war	0.2	0.2	0	Score affirmation: New Zealand does not have any disputes likely to give rise to the potential use of force against a country.
New Zealand	Labour strikes	1.9	1.9	0	Score affirmation: Upcoming elections mean a continued risk of industrial action, but disruption rarely lasts longer than 3 days.
Nicaragua	Protests and riots	2.3	2.4	0.1	Increased risk of protests if COVID-19 spreads widely, straining government response capacities.
Nigeria	Terrorism	5.2	5.5	0	Islamist militants are likely to stage further major attacks against security forces weakened and distracted by COVID-19 restrictions
North Korea	Interstate war	2.8	2.7	-0.1	South Korea and the US are less likely to respond militarily to perceived North Korean provocations during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Pakistan	Protests and riots	3.2	3.5	0.3	Protests are likely to increase after COVID-19 containment measures are eased, with small business owners demanding compensation from the government.
Pakistan	Interstate war	3.9	3.7	-0.2	Government efforts are likely to focus on domestic management of COVID-19 outbreak, reducing likelihood of skirmishes with India.
Palestinian Territory, Occupied	Terrorism	2.9	3.2	0.3	Increased likelihood of a collapse in PA-Israel security co-operation, entailing high terrorism risks.
Panama	Labour strikes	2.7	3.0	0.3	Probability of unions striking to prevent layoffs to rise over the next year as COVID-19 hurts the economy.
Papua New Guinea	Civil war	1.9	2.0	0.1	A tribal massacre in Enga in March 2020 increases the risk of tribal warfare causing a deterioration of the security environment in the region.
Papua New Guinea	Protests and riots	2.9	2.9	0	Score affirmation: There remains potential for violent protests in Port Moresby and for protests affecting the LNG sector.
Papua New Guinea	Labour strikes	2.7	2.7	0	Score affirmation: COVID-19-related revenue shortfall means civil servants may not be paid, increasing the risk of strike action.
Papua New Guinea	Terrorism	1.2	1.2	0	Score affirmation: Tensions remain high in the Highlands, with the potential for attacks on security forces and LNG assets.
Papua New Guinea	Interstate war	0.9	0.6	-0.3	No recent escalations in diplomatic disputes with Pacific island states, indicating in a low risk of interstate conflict over the coming year.
Peru	Protests and riots	2.7	2.7	0	Score affirmation: Proliferation of disinformation throughout social media and panic buying to increase looting risks.
Peru	Protests and riots	2.7	2.7	0.0	Score affirmation: Early economic, lockdown, and social-distancing measures reducing COVID-19 spread and looting risks
Philippines	Terrorism	3.0	3.0	0	Score affirmation: COVID-19-induced ceasefire unlikely to lead to successful peace talks.
Philippines	Civil war	2.7	2.7	0	Score affirmation: COVID-19-induced ceasefire unlikely to lead to successful peace talks.

Poland	Labour strikes	1.8	1.6	-0.2	Industrial action likely to overall subside over the COVID-19 outbreak, except in the health sector and security services if overburdened.
Poland	Protests and riots	2.3	2.0	-0.3	Protests likely to overall subside as movement and gatherings are restricted during the COVID-19 outbreak.
Puerto Rico	Protests and riots	2.2	1.8	-0.4	COVID-19 outbreak likely to result in smaller violent protests due to implementation of isolation regimes.
Réunion	Civil war	0.9	1.5	0.6	Mass protests against central government economic policies occur occasionally but a strong independence movement is lacking.
Réunion	Terrorism	1.0	1.5	0.5	Conviction of local citizen for terrorism indicates homegrown Islamist radicalisation.
Réunion	Labour strikes	1.5	1.9	0.4	Strong trade unions follow the model of mainland France; disruptive industrial action is likely.
Réunion	Interstate war	0.9	1.1	0.2	Interstate disputes are unlikely to result in the use of military force.
Romania	Labour strikes	2.4	2.1	-0.3	Although risk is decreasing due to the COVID-19 outbreak, strikes remain likely across sectors over lack of protective equipment.
Romania	Protests and riots	2.1	1.5	-0.6	Government restrictions on assembly due to COVID-19 outbreak likely to reduce protest risks in the one-year outlook.
Russian Federation	Protests and riots	1.5	1.4	-0.1	Government restrictions on assembly due to COVID-19 outbreak likely to reduce protest risks in the one-year outlook.
Senegal	Protests and riots	2.0	1.7	-0.3	Stringent measures lasting many weeks to ban public gatherings in response to the COVID-19 virus are likely to be widely observed.
Slovenia	Labour strikes	2.0	1.8	-0.2	Industrial action likely to overall subside over the COVID-19 outbreak, except in the health sector and security services if overburdened.
Slovenia	Protests and riots	0.9	0.6	-0.3	Protests likely to subside overall as movement and gatherings are restricted during the COVID-19 outbreak.
South Africa	Protests and riots	3.5	3.1	-0.4	A ban on large gatherings lowers the risk of large protests in the major cities.
South Korea	Interstate war	2.4	2.3	0.1	South Korea and the US are less likely to respond militarily to perceived North Korean provocations during the COVID-19 pandemic.
South Sudan	Terrorism	4.2	3.6	0	Defection of senior SPLM-IO military figures to President Kiir reduces opposition military capabilities.
South Sudan	Civil war	5.2	4.7	0	Defection of senior SPLM-IO military figures to President Kiir reduces opposition military capabilities.
South Sudan	Interstate war	2.4	2.2	-0.2	Sudan and South Sudan agreed to extend existing oil transit arrangements, indicating improved bilateral relations.
South Sudan	Civil war	5.7	5.2	-0.5	Award of defence and petroleum ministries to opposition in new unity government decreases chance of widespread fighting.
South Sudan	Terrorism	4.7	4.2	-0.5	Award of defence and petroleum ministries to opposition in new unity government decreases chance of skirmishes between army and opposition militia.
Sri Lanka	Protests and riots	2.5	2.7	0.2	Protest related to the government's COVID-19 response are likely after containment measures are relaxed.
Switzerland	Protests and riots	0.9	0.8	-0.1	The government's emergency measures to contain the spreading of the COVID-19 virus have significantly reduced the probability of larger protests.
Taiwan	Labour strikes	1.9	1.9	0	Score affirmation: Economic downturn may lead to industrial actions, especially in service industries.
Taiwan	Protests and riots	1.6	1.5	-0.1	Ruling party gained in popularity due to its response to COVID-19, reducing protest risks.
Tajikistan	Protests and riots	1.0	0.9	-0.1	Government restrictions on assembly due to COVID-19 outbreak likely to reduce protest risks in the one-year outlook.

Tanzania, United Republic of	Protests and riots	2.7	2.5	-0.2	Lack of protest activity at local elections indicates that only localised violent protests are likely during the 2020 election.
Thailand	Protests and riots	2.8	2.9	0.1	The government continues to struggle in responding to economic slowdown and COVID-19 impacts, increasing protest risk.
Thailand	Labour strikes	1.5	1.6	0.1	Economic hardship increases the likelihood of industrial actions over pay and working conditions.
Tunisia	Terrorism	3.2	3.2	0	Score affirmation: Suicide attack in Tunis on 5 March highlights residual terrorism risks.
Tunisia	Protests and riots	3.6	3.4	-0.2	The COVID-19 outbreak and nationwide lockdown lowers protest risks in the one-month outlook.
Turkey	Civil war	2.5	2.4	-0.1	The government retains the upper hand in the fight against the PKK in southeast Turkey.
Turkey	Protests and riots	2.5	2.1	-0.4	The COVID-19 outbreak significantly lowers protests risks in the one-year outlook.
Turkmenistan	Protests and riots	2.2	2.3	0.1	Currency depreciation caused by low oil price increases likelihood of economically motivated anti-government protests.
Ukraine	Protests and riots	2.9	2.6	-0.3	Government restrictions on assembly due to COVID-19 outbreak likely to reduce protest risks in the one-year outlook.
United Kingdom	Protests and riots	2.2	2.3	0.1	Potential COVID-19-related shortages of basic goods increases risk of protests.
United Kingdom	Terrorism	1.9	1.9	0	Score affirmation: Greater probable use of emergency powers will balance security service overstretch from COVID-19.
United Kingdom	Protests and riots	2.3	1.9	-0.4	The government's emergency measures to contain the spreading of the COVID-19 virus have reduced the probability of larger protests.
United States	Protests and riots	2.5	2.6	0.1	Looting risk in major cities is temporarily high due to closing of schools for COVID-19.
Vietnam	Labour strikes	2.2	2.4	0.2	The adverse economic impact of COVID-19 on the manufacturing sector increases the risk of strikes.
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of	Protests and riots	3.6	3.8	0.2	Ongoing shortages of food and basic products, including medicines, to intensify with COVID-19 spread, increasing looting risks.
Virgin Islands, U.S.	Protests and riots	1.1	0.8	-0.3	COVID-19 outbreak likely to result in smaller violent protests due to implementation of isolation regimes.
Zambia	Protests and riots	3.3	3.4	0.1	Declining copper revenues and persistent power cuts driving anti-government protests especially in the Copperbelt and Lusaka Provinces.
Zambia	Labour strikes	3.5	3.5	0	Score affirmation: Declining copper revenues and persistent power cuts driving labour protests especially in the Copperbelt and Lusaka Provinces.

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